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The Nature of Resilience 
The advent of resilience strategies in the field of emergency planning and response has 
been premised on a profound re-evaluation of the referents of security governance.  
Together, the discovery of the ‘myth’ of panic and the natural resilience of populations 
has encouraged the spread of resilience strategies which aim to promote the adaptive 
and self-organizational capacities of populations in emergency.  This article seeks to 
advance an alternative to this positivist explanation: that the appearance of ‘resilient 
populations’ is the correlate of a broader restructuring of rationalities and practices 
comprising liberal governance. Tracing the evolution of the figure of the natural 
underpinning liberal governmentalities through the historical development of Ecology 
and Economics, this article looks to make explicit the epistemological order supportive 
of neoliberal governance. In doing so, this article identifies the historical conditions of 
possibility for ‘resilient populations’ to emerge as a referent of governance 
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Introduction 
 
Panic has long figured as a principle consideration guiding strategies of emergency 
governance.  Its spectacular fall from a core operational assumption organizing 
emergency response well into the final days of the Cold War to its current status within 
academic literatures as ‘myth’1 must therefore be regarded as a pivotal event in the 
history of emergency governance. 
In stark contrast to the competitive, self-interested behaviour assumed to 
accompany emergencies, disaster researchers have documented the widespread 
cooperation—even altruism—which often manifests during disasters. Social norms, far 
from breaking down, not only continued to govern behaviour2  but proved remarkably 
resilient with incidences of violence and crime often subsiding significantly.3  To the 
extent that ‘irrational behaviour’, or panic, was witnessed, experts argued that these 
were in fact rational decisions based on imperfect knowledge within a rapidly unfolding 
event, which only appeared to onlookers as irrational.4  Panic, we are now told, is 
nothing more than a fallacious, culturally ingrained belief, perpetuated through its 
ubiquitous appearance in media portrayals of emergencies, but having no basis in 
reality.5  Disaster researchers have also noted the implications of this research on the 
organization, direction, and conduct of emergency response.6  Government, within an 
unfolding emergency, should not look to direct, but to supplement and encourage the 
natural tendencies of those in emergency events to help themselves. Instead of 
                                                            
1 Lee Clarke, “Panic: Myth or Reality?,” Contexts Fall (2002); Chris Cocking, John Drury, and Steve 
Reicher, “The Psychology of Crowd Behaviour in Emergency Evacuations: Results from Two Interview 
Studies and Implications for the Fire and Rescue Services,” The Irish Journal of Psychology 30, no. 1–2 
(2009): 59–73; N. Johnson, “Panic and the Breakdown of Social Order: Popular Myth, Social Theory and 
Empirical Evidence,” Sociological Focus 20 (1985): 171–183; J P Keating, “The Myth of Panic,” Fire 
Journal 147 (1982): 56–61; Ben Sheppard et al., “Terrorism and Dispelling the Myth of a Panic Prone 
Public.,” Journal of Public Health Policy 27, no. 3 (January 2006): 219–45; discussion 246–9, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17042122; Kathleen Tierney, “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional 
Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9-11,” in Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, 
New Ideas, ed. Lee Clarke (Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 2003), 33–52; S Wessely, “Don’t Panic! Short and 
Long Term Psychological Reactions to the New Terrorism: The Role of Information and the Authorities,” 
Journal of Mental Health 14, no. 1 (2005): 1–6. 
2 Cocking, Drury, and Reicher, “The Psychology of Crowd Behaviour in Emergency Evacuations: Results 
from Two Interview Studies and Implications for the Fire and Rescue Services”; Jonathan D Sime, 
“Affiliative Behaviour During Escape to Building Exits,” Journal of Environmental Psychology 3, no. 2 
(1983): 21–41; John Drury, Chris Cocking, and Steve Reicher, “Everyone for Themselves? A 
Comparative Study of Crowd Solidarity Among Emergency Survivors,” British Journal of Social 
Psychology 48 (2009): 487–506. 
3 Erik Auf der Heide, “Common Misconceptions About Disasters: Panic, the ‘Disaster Syndrome’ and 
Looting,” in The First 72 Hours: A Community Approach to Disaster Preparedness, ed. Margaret 
O’Leary (Lincoln: iUniverse Publishing, 2004), 340–380; Tierney, “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional 
Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9-11.” 
4 Ibid. 
5 Clarke, “Panic: Myth or Reality?”; Tierney, “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling 
Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9-11.” 
6 R. Dynes and T. Drabek, “The Structure of Disaster Research: Its Policy and Disciplinary Implications,” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 12, no. 1 (1994): 5–23; Siambabala Bernard 
Manyena, “The Concept of Resilience Revisited,” Disasters 30, no. 4 (December 2006): 433–50, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17100752. 
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withholding information, for fear of inciting panic, populations in emergency should be 
provided with all the information they require to self-organize an evacuation or 
response.7   People are to be encouraged, not directed; managed, not controlled.   
The acknowledgement that panic is a ‘myth’ has lent support to the profound 
reorganization of UK emergency governance at the turn of the century.  Departing 
radically from the disciplinary logic which guided British Civil Defence over the course 
of the Cold War, the resilience strategies of UK Civil Contingencies are instead oriented 
towards facilitating and optimizing the natural, self-organizational capacities, or 
‘resilience’, of populations-in-emergency.8 The advent of resilience strategies within 
UK Civil Contingencies has thus been explained as the result of an improved 
conceptualization of the referents of security.  But disaster research also serves to 
legitimise resilience strategies by premising the introduction of these policies on an 
empirically validated re-evaluation of collective human behaviour within emergency 
events.  Indeed, resilience strategies are routinely celebrated as demonstrative of the 
growing humanism of emergency governance. Within these narratives, resilience 
enjoins the positivism of social science with the emancipatory project of liberalism: 
Knowledge of the nature of ‘the social’ permits less governance, less control and more 
‘freedom’.   
This article seeks to advance an alternative to this positivist explanation: that the 
appearance of ‘resilient populations’ is an effect, rather the cause, of a broader 
restructuring of rationalities and practices comprising liberal governance.  Such an 
explanation challenges the idea that resilience represents an objective ‘discovery’ of 
(social) science.  Instead, resilient populations are taken to be a particular enframing of 
life forged and sustained through the repeated exercise of practices governance.  Such 
an approach entails placing a priority on the constitutive effect of practices in shaping 
our understanding of the world around us.1  Moreover, it draws attention to the 
ontopolitical status of resilient populations as a referent of governance.  To say that 
resilience is the correlate of neoliberalism does not mean that resilient populations are 
an illusion or a ‘false’ conception.  On the contrary, such a claim invities critical inquiry 
into the processes through which resilient populations were rendered ‘true’, panic was 
deemed ‘false’, and the implications of this shift for the ways in which governmental 
power is exercised during emergencies. 
This article aims to identify the conditions under which resilient populations 
could emerge as a referent of emergency governance.  It does so by investigating 
transformations in the order of power/knowledge underpinning liberal governance.  Our 
analysis begins by recognizing the importance which the ‘natural’ status of the market 
played in the historical genesis of liberalism as an art of governance.  As disciplines 
with an authority on the composition of ‘the natural’, the historical co-evolution of 
Economics and Ecology is quickly traced with the aim of rendering explicit their 
common archaeological structure.  Emphasis is placed on the function of equilibrium-
based models (which persisted from classical studies of balance to the cybernetically-
                                                            
7 G Proulx and J D Sime, “To Prevent ‘Panic’ in an Underground Emergency: Why Not Tell People the 
Truth?",” in Fire Safety Science - Proceedings of the Third International Symposium, ed. G Cox and B 
Langford (London: Elsevier Applied Science, 1991), 843–852. 
8 Christopher Zebrowski, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience,” 
Political Perspectives 3, no. 1 (2009): 1–38; Mareile Kaufmann, “Emergent Self-organisation in 
Emergencies: Resilience Rationales in Interconnected Societies,” Resilience : International Policies , 
Practices and Discourses 1, no. 1 (2013): 37–41. 
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inflected discourses dominant in the period following the Second World War) in 
providing nature a telos and liberal governance an objective.  C.S. Holling’s resilience 
theory is next examined as a radical departure from classical equilibrium based models 
towards an atelic figure of nature composed of multiple, emergent equilibria.  The 
simultaneous rearticulation of Ecology and Economics within the framework of the 
complexity sciences is taken as a profound shift in the order of ‘the natural’ enabling the 
development of novel forms of government.  Turning to Hayek’s appropriation of the 
complexity discourses in his later career, this study looks to identify the historical 
singularity of ‘environmental’ techniques of exercising power.  Taken together, this 
novel account of nature coupled with environmental techniques of government is 
understood to forge a novel regime of knowledge/power.  The final section of this 
article accounts for the appearance of resilient populations as function of the emergence 
of this regime. 
 
The nature of Nature 
 
Before the term oecology was coined by German Darwinist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, 
references to the study of ‘nature’s economy’ abounded.  The phrase derived from 
Linnaeus’ 1749 The Oeconomy of Nature: a study of the divine order visible within 
nature’s design.  In the late eighteenth century the term oeconomy still carried a 
connotation with household management—the original sense of the term from which it 
derives the prefix oikos, Greek for home or habitation.  Thus, the title of Linnaeus’ 
highly influential 1749 The Oeconomy of Nature referred to the transcendent Creator’s 
orderly design of nature rather than an allusion to ‘political economy’ in the 
contemporary sense.  Early studies of nature’s economy marvelled at the balance and 
harmony achieved by this divine design which paired ends with means down to the 
infinitely small detail.9  Yet, while God’s infinite attention to detail was a source of 
marvel, it provided a problem for translating nature into a model for human governance.  
While man could aspire to this level of management, it was only God, with his infinite 
wisdom, who could achieve such perfection in design.   
Ecology,10 which emerged as a field of study at the threshold of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was to purge the idea of a transcendent 
ordering of nature by a divine Creator and replace it with a model of immanent self-
ordering through competition. As is well known, Darwin credited Thomas Malthus for 
insights leading him to the theory of natural selection, which echoed economic notions 
of the invisible hand as a mechanism responsible for the immanent self-ordering of the 
market.  However, the success of classical economic liberalism was similarly based on 
its success in articulating market mechanisms as ‘natural’.  In his lecture series The 
Birth of Biopolitics Foucault discusses how from the middle of the eighteenth century 
the market transitions from a site of jurisdiction against fraud—a significant risk 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—to a site of veridiction: ‘a site and a 
                                                            
9 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: a History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
10 In 1893 it was decided by the International Botanical Congress to change the name of the field to our 
modern spelling ‘ecology’ (Worster, 1994) 
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mechanism for the formation of truth’.11   Integral to this shift, Foucault argues, was the 
‘discovery’ of the market’s ability, when left to its own devices, to generate a ‘natural 
price’: one which accurately represents the relation between costs of production and 
demand.  The ‘natural’ status of the market was used to argue for the displacement of 
government intervention from ensuring justice within the market to limiting interference 
(and especially political interference) with these ‘natural’ mechanisms. 
While references to ordered harmony faded as both fields became similarly 
conceptualized as sites of competition for scarce resources, the emphasis on balance 
would be preserved and given ‘scientific’ rigour within studies of market equilibrium.  
In his 1874 Elements of a Pure Economics Léon Walras provided the foundations for 
general equilibrium theory by outlining the basic equations for a general equilibrium 
model and advanced a proof for the existence of a solution.12  Moreover, Walras sought 
to specify how this solution would be arrived at through the ‘natural’ adjustment 
mechanisms which exist within a competitive market.  Competitive markets arrived at 
equilibrium prices—those which perfectly coordinate aggregate demand with supply so 
as to clear the market—through a process of tâtonnement (‘groping towards’).13  If 
prices were set under equilibrium levels, so as to render supply insufficient for demand, 
then prices would slowly climb as markets ‘groped towards’ equilibrium level, and vice 
versa.  Through a process of ‘sequential’ tâtonnement markets would clear, one at a 
time, until prices converged at a general equilibrium.  Likewise, destabilization of prices 
following an economic shock would be expected to adjust through tâtonnement back to 
equilibrium over time. 
The natural tendency towards equilibrium was echoed at this time within 
ecological treatments of succession.  By the turn of the twentieth century, ecology had 
become a prominent field, in large part due to its perceived insight into the integration 
of political and economic units which were used to inform strategies of social, and 
especially colonial, administration.14  It is not unsurprising then, that a primary area of 
study was ecological succession: the colonization of plant and animal communities 
within a given region over time.  Succession was premised on the widespread 
assumption of progressive development of a biotic community, consisting of both 
animal and vegetal species.  Of particular influence to the field were Fredric Clements’ 
theories of succession—widely suspected of having been derived from his reading of 
sociologist, and social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer.15  Biotic communities were thought 
to progress from a relatively homogenous and undifferentiated community (in human 
terms: a hunter-gatherer society) to more heterogeneous ‘complex’ communities in 
which functions were harmonized into a functioning whole (modern European 
societies)—which for Clements, as for Spencer, functioned as a ‘super-organism’.  
Increased harmonization of the whole would absolve the need for further adaptation, 
                                                            
11 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979, Michel 
Foucault: Lectures at the Collège De France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 30. 
12 Léon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics: Or the Theory of Social Wealth (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 169. 
13 Ibid, 170. 
14 Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
15 Worster, Nature’s Economy: a History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd Ed.; Anker, Imperial Ecology: 
Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945; Chunglin Kwa, “Romantic and Baroque 
Conceptions of Complex Wholes in the Sciences,” in Complexities: Social Studies of Knowledge 
Practices (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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thus halting evolution at what Clements would term a climax community.  A climax 
community refers to the ecological composition of this biotic (or human) community 
within the final stage in its development.   The type of vegetation composing the climax 
stage—be it a forest, desert, marsh, grassland, or otherwise—was said to be predefined 
by regional climatic variables such as temperature, rainfall and wind. While external 
shocks to an ecological community could disrupt this progression, nature would always 
rebound to continue its march through intermediary stages, known as seres, towards its 
climatically defined climax.   
  In 1935 Arthur Tansley outlined an inventory of systems based on the value of 
‘stability’.16  Stability was measured by the ability of a system to maintain its 
composure over time.  The ‘ecosystem’, a term appearing for the first time in this paper 
in distinction to the ‘biotic communities’ and ‘complex organisms’ found in the holistic 
theories of Clements and Smuts, was a relatively unstable system given the range of 
factors both internal and external which could disrupt equilibrium.  Yet the natural 
return of the system to equilibrium was assumed almost without question.  “The 
universal tendency to the evolution of dynamic equilibria has long been recognized” and 
thus was provided no further explanation within the paper.17  Kwa has suggested that 
this self-evidence may be related to the widespread reference in explanations of life 
processes at the turn of the century to Le Chatelier's late nineteenth century experiments 
which demonstrated that endogenous shocks to a chemical equilibrium would be 
responded to by other factors so as to restore equilibrium.18 
The scientification of ecology at this time was mirrored within the fields of 
economics.  From the 1930’s, Walrasian microeconomics would become more 
rigorously mathematicized as part of an overall trend in economics.19  In the process, 
core concepts such as equilibrium, stability and the process of tâtonnement would be 
fundamentally reinterpreted.20  Tâtonnement would be rearticulated during this time to 
make it amenable to the ascendant neoclassical synthesis of Walrasian (microeconomic) 
theory and Keynesian (macroeconomic) theory, which effectively displaced a number of 
rival theories including Institutionalist, Marxist, and Austrian perspectives during this 
period.21  Walrasian sequential tâtonnement would be replaced within the literature by 
Samuelson’s version of tâtonnement which foregrounded speed of adjustment and more 
adequately accommodated Keynesian concerns regarding the ‘stickiness’ of some 
markets in adjusting to equilibrium including especially, labour markets.  Keynesian 
demand-management could thus be justified in assisting processes of tâtonnement to 
restore equilibrium in a more efficient and timely manner. 
The common archaeological structure of the fields of ecology and economics 
from the time of their co-constitution was premised on a ‘natural’ telos towards a unique 
equilibrium following a systemic perturbation.  The stability of systems to withstand 
                                                            
16 A G Tansley, “The Use and the Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” Ecology 16, no. 3 (1935): 
284–307. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Kwa, “Romantic and Baroque Conceptions of Complex Wholes in the Sciences”, 33. 
19 Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 7; E Roy Weintraub, How Economics Became a Mathematical Science (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
20 Ibid, 125. 
21 D Wade Hands, “The Rise and Fall of Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory: The Keynes Effect,” The 
First International Symposium on the History of Economic Thought “The Integration of Micro and 
Macroeconomics from a Historical Perspective”. (University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil., 2009). 
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shock—to move only incrementally away from equilibrium and return to it quickly 
thereafter—was recognized as a value with which to assess these systems and inform 
programmes of governance.    The diagram of governance operating in relation to this 
ontologization of nature would operate a security logic of protection designed to protect 
systems from shocks in the first place and speed their return to equilibrium following a 
perturbation.  This is what Holling would call ‘engineering resilience’,22 the security 
programme advocated by systems ecologists concerned with speedily restoring a 
presumed ‘natural’ equilibrium.  It was in opposition to both this logic of security that 
Holling would advance the notion of ‘ecological resilience’: a programme of 
governance which not reinterpreted the telos of security, but offered a radical re-
ontologization of nature rooted within the discourses of the complexity sciences. 
 
Transforming Nature 
 
In the 1950’s Clements’ theory of a climax community would be refigured, but 
essentially preserved, as functional homeostasis when ecology was translated into the 
discourse of cybernetics.  The ecosystem, understood as a cybernetic system, responded 
to destabilizing exogenous shocks through feedback mechanisms which would return 
the system to a pre-defined equilibrium state.  Written in response to these models C.S. 
Hollings’ highly influential Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems would 
challenge the notion that nature was itself organized around a unique ‘natural’ 
equilibrium and, with it, challenge the long established belief in nature’s telos.23  In 
doing so, Holling would draw on developments in third-wave cybernetics associated 
with chaos, complexity and self-organizing autopoietic systems in order to advance a 
security programme for ecosystemic sustainability which he would term ‘resilience.’  
Specifically, Holling took issue with the cybernetically-grounded ‘systems 
ecology’ of brothers Eugene and Howard (Tom) Odum.  Inspired by the writings of 
Alfred Lotka on the energetics of evolution, the brothers’ work used systems analysis to 
study the function of energy flows within a system.24  In the process, Tansley’s notion 
of ecosystem would be reconceptualised as a cybernetic system progressively 
developing towards a climax-state of ‘functional homeostasis’.  In The Strategy of 
Ecosystem Development the idea of functional homeostasis is presented as both nature’s 
telos and a security project: “In a word, the “strategy” of succession as a short-term 
process is basically the same as the “strategy” of long-term evolutionary development of 
the biosphere—namely, increased control of, or homeostasis with, the physical 
environment in the sense of achieving maximum protection from its perturbations”.25   
Achieving “maximum protection”, it is noted, may however conflict with man’s 
emphasis on “maximum production”—an idea that is given further development by 
                                                            
22 C.S. Holling, “Engineering Resilience Versus Ecological Resilience ,” in Engineering Within 
Ecological Constraints, ed. P Schulze (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996), 31–44. 
23 C.S. Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,” Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 4 (1973): 1–23. 
24 See Eugene Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: W. B. Saunders, 1953); B C 
Patten and Eugene Odum, “The Cybernetic Nature of Ecosystems,” American Naturalist 118 (1981): 
886–895; Howard Odum, Systems Ecology (New York: John Wiley, 1983). 
25 Eugene Odum, “The Strategy of Ecoystem Development,” Science 164, no. 3877 (1969): 262–270, 
262. 
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Eugene’s brother Howard in Environment, Power and Society.26  Here, H. T. Odum 
reflected on the implications of industrial-led growth for the sustainability of Western 
eco-systems, arguing that the depletion of fossil-based resources would demand a 
fundamental restructuring of economies along sustainable lines.  Achieving such a 
programme would require a massive effort in the control engineering of economies with 
an eye to the natural limits of ecosystems.27   
Holling’s work would challenge the command and control approaches to 
ecosystem management advocated by systems ecologists, in favour of what he would 
term a resilience approach.  Earliest mention of the concept appeared within Resilience 
and stability of ecological systems.28  The paper immediately takes aim at quantitative 
approaches to ecosystem management, stating that the application of systems analysis to 
the study of ecosystems places an excessive emphasis on equilibrium which “may 
simply reflect an analytic approach developed in one area because it was useful and then 
transferred to another where it may not be”.29  Instead, questions of sustainability 
require a shift in “emphasis from the equilibrium states to the conditions for 
persistence”.30 
Over the course of the article, Holling progressively outlines a new ontology of 
ecosystems rooted in the discourse of complex adaptive systems.  Critically, Holling 
dismisses the idea that ecosystems organize around a single equilibrium point to which 
a system will automatically return following systemic shock.  Rather, the particular 
attractor around which a system is organized represents only one of a multitude of 
possible states, which emerge and disappear over time.  A system will continue to 
organize around a particular attractor given the presence of feedback mechanisms 
related to levels of biodiversity.  The range in which a system can operate whilst 
organizing around the same attractor is referred to as a stability domain.  Stability 
domains themselves evolve over time, expanding or contracting based on the size and 
number of these feedback loops operating around an attractor.  The gradual weakening 
of the feedback loops operating around an attractor, for example through the loss of 
biodiversity within an ecosystem, can make a system more fragile and susceptible to 
shocks that will transfer it out of its current stability domain, towards an attractor 
organised around different processes.  Depending on the nature of the feedback cycles 
within a regime, a transition may either be gradual or sudden—which accounts for the 
non-linear phase shifts of a system over time. 
Holling was eager to emphasize the implications of this new ontology of nature 
for ecosystem management.  He criticized efforts to protect vulnerable populations 
through system stabilizing approaches focused on maintaining the system in an 
equilibrium state.  Programmes based on maintaining an optimal level of a population, 
such as those of Maximum Sustained Yield or protectionist policies designed to 
eliminate competitors and predators, have had, in some documented cases, the 
unintended consequences of reducing the overall resilience of a system: “a measure of 
the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still 
                                                            
26 Howard Odum, Environment, Power and Society (New York and Sydney: Wiley Interscience, 1971). 
27 Melinda Cooper and Jeremy Walker, “Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the 
Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation,” Security Dialogue 14, no. 2 (2011), 6. 
28 Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems.” 
29 Ibid, 1. 
30 Ibid, 2.  
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maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables”.31  Eroding the 
resilience of a system would leave it more susceptible to even minor external 
perturbations—random events such as climactic change, fire or pollution—which could 
flip the system into another stability domain and potentially increase the risk of 
wholesale species extinction.32  According to Holling, for ecosystem management “the 
important point is not so much how stable they are within the domain, but how likely it 
is for the system to move from one domain into another and so persist in a changed 
configuration”.33 Going further, Holling suggested that in many cases what appears to 
be an instability within a system, such as widely fluctuating population levels of a 
particular species, can in fact contribute to systemic resilience.34  Again, an 
overemphasis on stability within equilibrium-centred approaches should in fact be 
reconsidered and replaced by an approach which aimed to increase the resilience of a 
system through a study of the dynamics underlying its domain of attraction.  In his 
concluding paragraph Holling characterized a resilience approach in terms of 
epistemological modesty, an acknowledgment of the limits of human understanding. 
 
A management approach based on resilience…would emphasize the need to keep options 
open, the need to view events in a regional rather than a local context, and the need to 
emphasize heterogeneity.  Flowing from this would be not the presumption of sufficient 
knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the assumption that future events are 
expected, but that they will be unexpected.  The resilience framework can accommodate 
this shift in perspective, for it does not require a precise capacity to predict the future, but 
only a qualitative capacity to devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future 
events in whatever unexpected form they may take.35 
Over the course of his career, Holling would develop and elaborate an approach 
to managing ecosystems composed of multiple, emergent equilibria.  Departing from 
equilibrium-focused techniques focused on systemic stability, a resilience approach, as 
outlined by Holling, would focus on optimizing the conditions for persistence of a 
species or ecosystem.  Enhancing a system’s resilience could be achieved in two ways.36  
Firstly, one could attempt to move the system further away from a critical threshold that 
would send it towards an alternate attractor.  However, positioning a system away from 
an attractor could come at the cost of systemic efficiency.  Alternatively, resilience can 
be enhanced by expanding the stability domain around an attractor.  As Gunderson and 
Holling have noted, this second solution—which seeks to engender resilience into a 
system—not only increases the capacity of a system to withstand the impact of 
potentially destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to quickly and efficiently 
reorganise so as to capitalize on emerging opportunities.37   
Security, within a resilience framework, was no longer a conservative enterprise.  
It was an opportunity to evolve.  Governance, rather than maintaining systems around 
‘natural’ equilibrium points through normative/disciplinary techniques, would be 
reoriented towards enhancing the conditions of a systems capacity for adaptive 
                                                            
31 Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems”, 14. 
32 Ibid, 9. 
33 Ibid, 10. 
34 Ibid, 16-17. 
35 Ibid, 21. 
36 Ibid. 
37 C.S. Holling, Lance H Gunderson, and Garry D. Peterson, “Sustainability and Panarchies,” in 
Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, ed. C S Holling and L H 
Gunderson (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002), 63–102, 76. 
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emergence. To appreciate the significance of this new programme for liberal 
governance we should now turn to examine associated developments which were 
occurring simultaneously in the field of Political Economy. 
 
The Nature of Neoliberalism 
 
A year after Holling’s groundbreaking paper, Friedrich von Hayek was awarded the 
1974 Nobel Prize in economics.  In his acceptance speech, subsequently published 
under the title The Pretence of Knowledge,38 Hayek railed against the hubris of 
Keynesian ‘scientistism’ in the context of the ongoing international stagflation crisis.  
Echoing Holling, Hayek charged economists with committing the ‘scientistic error’ of 
naively appropriating the mathematically rigorous models of the physical sciences 
without sufficient regard to the differences between the fields.  The market, Hayek 
maintained citing prominent cyberneticist Warren Weaver to lend credibility to his 
assertion, displayed an ‘essential complexity’ which precluded mathematical modelling.  
Despite his earlier criticism of “slavish imitation of the method and language of 
science"39 by economists, Hayek would increasingly draw upon the discourses of 
complexity to articulate his understanding of the market and promote a form of 
neoliberal economic governance sensitive to the powerful self-organizing capacities of 
the market.40  Consistent with classical liberalism, Hayek interpreted the ‘natural’ status 
of the market to confer limits on the degree to which government could regulate and 
control its processes.  Where Hayek’s project increasingly diverged from classical 
articulations of liberalism over the course of his career was on the nature of the ‘natural’ 
itself. 
Hayek singled out in his Nobel Prize speech the Club of Rome’s report on The 
Limits to Growth41 as demonstrative of the status afforded to dubious science which 
transgressed the limits of what it could rightfully determine.42  The report had received 
significant attention in light of its provocative thesis that the sustainability of 
exponential economic growth was untenable, with the limits to this trajectory likely to 
be reached within the century.  The MIT research group behind the report applied 
systems analysis to computer models to extrapolate the interaction between population 
growth, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion over time.  
Altering these variables across a range of possible future scenarios the MIT team 
concluded that the rate of depletion of the finite resources upon which industrial 
economies were based raised significant concerns about the limits to economic growth.  
Echoing the prescription of Howard Odum, the report suggested that “it is possible to 
alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of ecological and economic 
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stability that is sustainable far into the future”43 if economic growth was engineered 
along sustainable lines within a steady-state economy which respected ecological and 
biotic equilibria. 
For Hayek, in such a complex field as the market, that which is important for 
study is rarely quantifiable.  Yet, the scientific status afforded prima facie to 
quantitative studies had encouraged analysis of those factors which can be measured, 
regardless of their overall importance to the dynamics of the market.  Even the positive 
correlation between aggregate demand and total employment may only be approximate, 
Hayek suggested.  However, insofar as it is the only cause for which we have 
quantitative data it has been taken as a scientific truth despite the fact that it may only 
be partial explanation of more complex processes.  What may, in fact, contribute more 
substantially to unemployment—namely, discrepancies between distribution of demand 
for goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources mandated for 
production—cannot be demonstrated in relation to quantitative evidence and, as a result, 
had been ignored by policy-makers. 
Just as policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) had eroded the resilience 
of complex ecosystems over time, Hayek purported that Keynesian demand-
management approaches have had a debilitating effect on the ability of the underlying 
economic system to adjust to misallocations in labour and capital—the real cause of 
high unemployment, according to Hayek.  By pumping money into sectors of the 
economy which only yield temporary demand, policies of Keynesian demand-
management only delay necessary structural adjustment and breed dependency on a 
continual flow of state-finance—both of which only serve to increase inflation.  What 
was required was instead a qualitative approach focused on optimizing the conditions 
for self-organization, adaptability and growth.  Hayek would characterize this approach 
as environmental:  
“if man is to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve social order, he will have 
to learn that in this and in other fields where essential complexity of an organized kind 
prevails, he cannot acquire full knowledge which would make mastery of the events 
possible.  He will therefore have to use what knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the 
results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate growth by providing 
the appropriate environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his 
plants”.44  
Environmental governance would invoke the nature of the market, in classical 
liberal fashion, to discourage interventionist state policies which might interfere with 
inherent processes of self-organization.  However, in conceptualizing the market in 
terms of an open, complex adaptive system45 Hayek would draw upon a fundamentally 
different understanding of nature than that which had been classically conceived in both 
the fields of Political Economy and Ecology.  For Hayek, the complexity of the market 
required a displacement of government efforts from intervening upon the processes of 
the economy itself to optimizing the conditions for self-organization and adaptive 
evolution.  As an open, complex system the economy evolved most effectively in far 
from equilibrium conditions and productively when liberated from the stagnating 
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control of the interventionist state.  As open systems, local economies, rather than being 
shielded from the wider economic environment through state finance, would need to be 
opened to it, in order to allow processes of adaptation and co-evolution to operate.  
Scholarship, in turn, would need to be conducted with requisite epistemological 
modesty, identifying the qualitative conditions in which the self-organization of the 
market is optimized.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault would recognize the singularity of the 
‘environmental technology’ operationalised within a neoliberal governmentality.46  
These techniques, he would stress, were not the equilibrium-based mechanisms of 
disciplinary society based on a “standardizing, identificatory, hierarchical 
individualization”.47  Rather, this is the 
“image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems 
of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority 
individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of 
the game rather than on the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of 
intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals”.48 
The advent of environmental technologies coincided with the “massive withdrawal [of] 
the normative-disciplinary system”.49 This is not a programme of standardization 
utilizing disciplinary technologies to structure the mentality of individuals in accordance 
with an ideal normality.  Nor is it a programme of biopolitical regulation operating on 
the ‘generality’ of aleatory events which, though unpredictable in their individual 
occurrence, display a constancy at the mass-level of the population in relation to which 
regulatory mechanisms could be introduced to “to establish an equilibrium, maintain an 
average, establish a homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general 
population and its aleatory field”.50  The idea of fixed norms and ‘natural’ equilibria, at 
the level of the individual and the population, are dispensed with entirely for an 
“environmentalism open to unknowns and transversal phenomena”.51  Foucault’s lecture 
notes conclude with a provocative question: “But does this mean that we are dealing 
with natural subjects? [end of manuscript]”.52   
If environmental technologies operated in relation to a ‘natural’ subject this was 
not to suggest either that they proceeded from a more objective rendering of the political 
subject or that they are involved with emancipating the subject from processes of 
political subjectification.   Rather, it was recognizing that population was itself now 
understood within the same ‘natural’ figure of the environment—characterized by non-
linear emergent self-organization. This re-conceptualization would have implications 
for liberal governance. Ensuring the subject is capable of co-evolution with their 
environment cannot be achieved by structuring the mentality of the subject, but was to 
proceed by acting on the subject’s environment, understood as an incentive structure 
and thus a condition of possibility for emergent norms and behaviours.  Security could 
thus no longer attempt to protect the subject from threat if this meant closing them off 
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from their milieu.  Instead, security would have to proceed by exposing the subject more 
fully to their environment so as to optimise its governmental effects in encouraging 
innovation and, crucially, adaptation. 
 
The Birth of Resilient Populations 
 
We have now established how the discursive framework advanced within the 
complexity sciences coupled with the environmental techniques of governance 
associated with neoliberalism comprised a novel apparatus of power/knowledge.  We 
may now account for the appearance of resilient populations as an effect of these 
transformations.  Following Foucault, it is imperative to recognize how an order of 
power/knowledge ‘marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately 
submits it to the division between true and false’.53  Priority is placed on the constitutive 
effect of practices in determining the objects of social science.  Resilient populations as 
such must be regarded as a particular enframing of life which arose as the correlate to 
neoliberal governance.  As an object constituted through the exercise of specific 
practices of governance, resilient populations cannot be said to properly ‘exist’ 
ontologically.  Nor could they be discovered.  They must instead be understood as the 
product of more obscure ontopolitical processes.  This requires a shift in perspective—
one which denies the existence of a fundamental logic underlying the ‘being’ of resilient 
populations, and instead attunes itself to the politics constitutive of resilient populations 
as a referent of governance.  Resilient populations are simply the correlative of practices 
of governance; an interpretation of social behaviour determined by, and supportive of, 
neoliberalism. 
These thoroughly political processes of objectification are what this article has 
attempted to begin fleshing out.  Given the immensity of the task, it would be 
impossible to exhaustively account for these processes here.  Instead this final section 
will investigate critical changes to the definition of panic which facilitated the 
appearance of ‘resilient populations. 
From the 1950s, substantial American military funding was being provided to 
researchers at The University of Chicago, the University of Maryland and the 
University of Oklahoma to investigate population behavior in civilian emergencies.54  
The military was interested in extrapolating the conclusions of these studies to 
understand how civilians react to crisis both to inform the design of domestic social 
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controls and direct offensive strategies.55  The empirical research collected corroborated 
the evidence of earlier studies, including those of Mintz and Strauss, which had argued 
that the behaviour of populations in emergency was better characterized as rational 
action, rather than irrational hysteria, based on an individual’s perception of their 
situation.56  This proposition was assisted by E.L. Quarantelli’s popular redefinition of 
panic as “actual (or attempted) physical flight”57 which, though more empirically 
verifiable, was quite obviously a radical departure from an understanding of panic in 
terms of irrational social hysteria.  Panic, Quarantelli concluded, is ‘a relatively 
uncommon phenomenon’ which is ‘over-exaggerated’ in disaster literature.58  To the 
extent that it does manifest,  
panic flight does not involve irrational thought if by that is meant anything in the way of 
faulty deductions from certain premises. From the position of an outside observer this 
may appear to be the case but, from a participant's viewpoint, given his limited 
perspective of only certain portions of the total situation, no such interpretation or 
irrationality can be made. For the fleeing of person, his action appears to him quite 
appropriate to the situation as he perceives it at that time.59 
Significantly, Quarantelli warns that “[o]ne of the most important contributory 
conditions [to the onset of panic] is the existence of a social or group predefinition of a 
crisis as one that is likely to eventuate in panic flight”.60  
While reminiscent of earlier studies which had investigating panic as a 
contagion,61 Quarantelli’s conception of panic displayed an important qualification.  
Panic’s transmission mechanism would no longer be perceived in energetic terms as a 
contagious affect which by exciting the body served to undermine rationality, and by 
extension sociality, but in terms of an adaptive, rational response to information within 
a situation of perceived entrapment.  This shift in the understanding of panic aligned 
with a broader trend in sociological research of the late 1950s in which notions of 
‘suggestibility’ and ‘contagion’ were displaced by an emphasis on emergent norms and 
adaptive tendencies as explanations of collective behavior.62  This shift was indicative 
of the creeping influence of cybernetics and information theory within American 
sociology which would come to understand the maintenance of a stable social order as a 
function of information exchange. 
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Jackie Orr identified that by the 1970s sociological studies of panic appeared far 
less frequently and were being displaced by mounting psychological research on ‘panic 
disorder’: a condition characterised by recurrent panic attacks (a sudden, uncontrollable 
onset of intense fear often accompanied by hyperventilation, perspiration, nausea, 
dizziness and heart palpitations) triggered by no observable cause.63  Assisted by 
Quarantelli’s rigorous, but ultimately far narrower, definition of panic in terms of flight, 
the very idea of panic was itself being transformed alongside the general trend towards 
cybernetic thinking taking place within American sociology.  No longer understood in 
terms of irrational hysteria, panic was now taken to be an adaptive response exhibited 
by a minority of individuals within a position of perceived entrapment.  Combating this 
behavior required opening communication channels and assisting participants by 
providing them with information upon which to base their decisions. 
Despite the mounting literature of disaster research, it was only at the turn of the 
twenty-first century that Disaster Research would affect a significant reorganization of 
emergency planning and response in Britain.  True, the end of the Cold War provided an 
opportunity, giving impetus to a radical rethink of UK Civil Contingencies in light of 
the widespread acknowledgement that Civil Defence was poorly suited to the ‘complex 
emergencies’ and ‘new security challenges’ of the 21st century.64  But, this 
reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies also indicates an important event which is 
much more difficult to pinpoint—the passing of panic below a particular threshold of 
truth and the validation of ‘resilient populations’ as a referent object of emergency 
governance.  What we can however begin to identify are the conditions within which 
such determinations could not be recognized as valid. 
 
Conclusion 
   
 The resilience of populations in emergencies is often portrayed as the discovery 
of a natural phenomenon by disaster researchers.  This article offers an alternative 
explanation with the aim of upsetting the predominance of this narrative.  Resilient 
populations, I suggest, are not a socio-historical constant whose essence can be 
objectively determined and communicated by science.  The appearance of resilient 
populations is the result of ontopolitical processes, rather than an objectively ontological 
discovery.  
This study has sought to locate the conditions under which resilient populations 
could emerge as a conceptual object and referent of governance.  It locates these 
conditions within transformations occurring in the order of power/knowledge 
supporting liberal governance.  Specifically, this article demonstrated how the coupling 
of a novel account of nature produced by the complexity turn within the disciplines of 
Ecology and Economics with ‘environmental’ techniques of government constituted a 
novel apparatus of power/knowledge which underpins contemporary neoliberalism.   
Priority was placed on the constitutive effects of practices in rendering ‘resilient 
populations’ as an empirical object of social science and referent object of governance 
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is an effect of neoliberal governance.  As such, the conditions under which resilient 
populations could appear as a conceptual object were located not in the advance of 
(social) science, but in the ascendance of neoliberalism as a regime of governance. 
Given the important role which panic played in enabling the disciplinary and 
biopolitical techniques of emergency governance historically, its current 
problematization within resilience discourses must be regarded as a pivotal event in the 
history of emergency governance.  But, of course, the exhaustiveness of this event 
should also not be overstated.  Panic has proved to be a remarkably persistent idea.  
Indeed, the widespread assumption of panic within popular imaginaries of disaster has 
been identified as a recurrent obstacle to the spread of resilience strategies.  Initiatives 
to enhance ‘community resilience’ have thus been accompanied by educational 
campaigns designed to raise public awareness of the fallacy of panic and promote good 
practice with regards to the governance of resilient populations.65  In spite of these 
efforts, the assumption of panic remains widespread with references to panic continuing 
to be found even within UK emergency planning guidance.66  The persistence of panic 
should, I believe, alert us firstly to the fact that resilience discourses, while ubiquitous, 
are far from hegemonic.  Panic is not simply a relic of the past, but something which 
continues to be manifest to the extent that disciplinary and biopolitical forms of 
government persist within the social field.  The colonisation of this space itself 
represents a condition of possibility for the continued evolution and spread of resilience 
discourses. 
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